Defining and identifying Russia’s elite groups: Siloviki representation during Putin’s third term by Broekman, Sam
  
Defining and identifying 
Russia’s elite groups 
Siloviki representation during Putin’s third term 
 
 
                                                                      
                                                            
                                   
  
  
 
  
Master’s Thesis 
Russian and Eurasian Studies  
Leiden University, The Netherlands 
23 January 2017 
 
Sam Broekman 
Student Number: 1605062 
 
Word Count: 18,005 
 
Supervisor: Dr. M. Frear 
1 
 
Table of contents 
 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 2 
Introducing the siloviki ......................................................................................................................... 2 
General research gaps ......................................................................................................................... 2 
Research question ............................................................................................................................... 3 
Methodology ....................................................................................................................................... 4 
Chapter overview ................................................................................................................................. 4 
Section 1: Rise of the siloviki..................................................................................................................... 6 
1.1 The Politburo 2.0 ........................................................................................................................... 6 
1.2 Putin’s return to the presidency .................................................................................................. 10 
Section 2: Conceptualizing the siloviki .................................................................................................... 13 
2.1 Agreements in defining siloviki .................................................................................................... 13 
2.2 Discussions in defining siloviki ..................................................................................................... 14 
2.3 Definition formation .................................................................................................................... 18 
Section 3: Positional selection ................................................................................................................ 20 
3.1 The separation of powers ............................................................................................................ 20 
3.2 Pre-selection issues...................................................................................................................... 21 
3.3 Mapping top-level positions ........................................................................................................ 22 
Section 4: Positional analysis .................................................................................................................. 32 
4.1 Explanation of study .................................................................................................................... 32 
4.2 Positional analysis results ............................................................................................................ 32 
4.3 Indications and prospects ............................................................................................................ 37 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 39 
Appendix ................................................................................................................................................ 40 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................... 47 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
Introducing the siloviki 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has experienced post-communist power 
structures that have shown various patterns under the successive presidencies of Boris Yeltsin and 
Vladimir Putin. During the Soviet era, leadership was dominated by the Communist Party and its 
nomenklatura who generally filled all the top-level governmental positions. Under Yeltsin, the chaotic 
and ineffective transition from communism to capitalism during the 1990s was accompanied by the 
rise of extreme wealthy businessman known as the ‘’oligarchs”. This elite group greatly benefited from 
the privatization of state-owned companies and soon exercised significant control over essential 
economic and political institutions. Often referred to as the ‘’seven bankers’’, the most influential of 
these tycoons including Boris Berezovsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky were 
immediately forced to cede power when Putin entered the presidency. 
Under Putin, the authoritarianization of Russia’s political landscape contributed to the creation of a 
new elite clan known as the “siloviki’’. Despite a lack of agreement on a clearly detailed definition of 
the term “siloviki”, this elite group is often basically referred to as politicians and officials who are 
active, or used to be active in one of the force structures which include state coercive institutions like 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Federal Security Service (FSB). In 
general, highly influential leaders including Sergey Ivanov, Viktor Ivanov and Nikolai Patrushev are 
often regarded as core members of this forceful siloviki team. Due to the influx of these elites with 
force structure backgrounds on key positions of power, Russia under Putin is often labelled a 
“militocracy” (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003, 289), or a “neo-KGB state” (The Economist 2007). 
This newly created inner circle of elites has ever since formed the backbone for Putin’s continuous 
power base and therefore gathered much attention from international scholars and media. Especially 
since Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, increased authoritarian practices are often linked to 
increased siloviki domination and therefore his current presidential term draws much attention.    
General research gaps  
Despite the attractiveness of extensive research on the siloviki elites, it generally appears that 
literature has been facing many difficulties leading to speculations, disagreements and other open 
spaces. As the group is theoretically often poorly understood, the first essential problem is that clear 
and operational definitions of siloviki are missing as scholars and media tend to forget to answer the 
basic question: who exactly are these elites, and what unites them? As a result, conclusions and claims 
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concerning the role of the siloviki often lack a reasonable basis and leave a significant number of 
uncertainties. Secondly, many studies are limited to an examination of the group’s role and omit 
systematic empirical research on representation numbers and related findings that provide broader 
insights. Besides, the relatively small number of existing empirical studies on the subject are outdated 
as they examined siloviki representation during Putin’s first two presidential terms (2000-2008) and 
don’t conduct any comparative analysis. As Putin’s third presidential term is rather underexposed, it 
fosters an environment conducive to research that would be helpful in order to provide new findings 
without on elite without the involvement of significant uncertainties. 
Research question 
This thesis intends to fill some of the open spaces by focussing on siloviki representation in top-level 
positions of power during Putin’s third presidential term. The specific purpose is to examine how 
siloviki representation has developed in comparison to earlier terms to ultimately conclude distinctive 
trends, especially regarding Putin’s increased authoritarian practices during his third presidential term. 
Therefore, this thesis addresses the following research question: How has siloviki representation in 
key positions of power developed during Putin’s third presidential term compared to his earlier terms? 
This question will be answered from a comparative perspective as this thesis aims to conclude 
undiscovered trends, and therefore earlier presidential terms are included as well. Representation is 
measured through provable presence of siloviki on the most significant positions of political power in 
order to prevent speculations and rough estimates. In contrast to earlier studies, this thesis focusses 
on a confined scope of elites on key positions of power, instead of total representation. In addition, 
not only representation of siloviki on top-level posts is measured but also other helpful elements that 
have received limited attentions by previous studies. These include findings on the specific 
backgrounds of the siloviki, dominance in certain institutional bodies, and length of services in one of 
the key positions.     
Three theoretical camps on the political influence of siloviki concluded by Peter Vaughn Sager assist in 
facilitating an answer to the main question. The first camp, the orthodox school, argues that Putin 
started filling as many top-level posts of power as possible with active reservist from the security 
services right after his entrance to the presidency in order to stabilize political control and personal 
power. The second camp, the critical school, argues that this large-scale influx of siloviki claimed by 
the orthodox school is exaggerated. The third camp, the revisionist school, largely follows the 
orthodox school but stresses that the siloviki clan is dominated by elites with a KGB or FSB background 
(Sager 2013, 7-9).  
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As discussed in more detail in the next section, according to recent political developments and the 
assumed link between increased authoritarianism and siloviki domination, the most obvious outcome 
would be an increase in the total number of siloviki on key positions during Putin’s third term. A 
decrease could however imply that Putin is moving away from the siloviki and that power is shifting 
towards another elite group(s), or possibly himself. 
This study is among the first attempts to examine siloviki representation during Putin’s third 
presidential term compared to his earlier terms, and ultimately aims to demonstrate that, as siloviki 
representation in key positions of power has declined during Putin’s third term compared to his earlier 
terms, there is no assumed link between increased authoritarianism and increased siloviki domination 
on key positions. In the context of this argument, the critical school is the most applicable theoretical 
camp as siloviki representation in key positions throughout the entire examined period (2000-2016) 
has been less substantial than is often assumed.    
Methodology 
Elite representation requires a transparent method that is practicable in the context of the research 
question. This thesis studies siloviki representation through an examination of the educational and 
occupational backgrounds of all politicians and officials who have filled the most influential positions 
of power between May 2000 and October 2016. Before conducting this positional identification, a 
clear framework needs to be established including two key elements: criteria for siloviki labelling 
through an operational conceptualization, and a selection of the most essential positions of power 
that are to be examined. This framework is established by the formulation of a clear and operational 
definition of siloviki through an extensive literature review, and a selection of key positions through an 
analysis of the Russian political system and its most influential institutions according to a number of 
selected criteria. Available bibliographic data primarily in English ultimately determines whether a 
politician or official can be given the status of a silovik. Results of this positional identification are used 
to provide new insights on siloviki representation during Putin’s third presidential term.  
Chapter overview 
In order to understand the rise of the siloviki, the first section elaborates on the correlation between 
Putin’s consolidation and personalization of power and the influx of siloviki personnel. Through a 
literature review, the second section formulates a clear and operational definition of siloviki by 
focussing on the most essential theoretical elements. As definitions of siloviki in literature are often 
unspecified and contradictory, the clear-cut conceptualization in this thesis should leave no room for 
ambiguity. The key positions of political power are determined through an analysis of the Russian 
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political system in the third section. Finally, the fourth section presents and discusses the results of the 
positional analysis. 
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Section 1: Rise of the siloviki 
This section serves as an introduction to the upcoming chapters as it analyzes key events and 
conditions that have contributed to the emergence of siloviki elites under Putin. The first part 
discusses the authoritarianization of Russia that has stimulated siloviki integration into politics during 
Putin’s first two presidential terms. It highlights some of the key features of the siloviki clan and 
shortly discusses earlier studies on their representation. The second part discusses Putin’s third 
presidential term and political conditions that have contributed to expectations of increased siloviki 
domination. It ultimately stresses the importance of empirical research on siloviki representation 
during Putin’s third presidential term, which likewise is the main motive for conducting the study in 
this thesis.  
1.1 The Politburo 2.0 
Russia’s new world of siloviki domination commenced with the appointment of Putin as the second 
president of the Russian Federation. After serving in the presidential staff and working as the director 
of the Federal Security Service (FSB; the KGB’s successor), Putin somewhat unexpectedly took the 
throne following an early resignation of Yeltsin in 1999. Heavily supported by Yeltsin, the Russian 
population, and some of the most influential oligarchs (including Berezovsky), Putin as a silovik himself 
easily won the elections in 2000 which are often labelled as the first democratic and peaceful transfer 
of power in Russian history (Rutland 2000, 313).   
Despite a lack of political experience, Putin and his administration immediately knocked down the 
turbulent democratic experience of 1990s and constructed a system with increased authoritarianism.  
In order to better understand the rise of the siloviki in the context of Putin’s consolidation and 
personalization of power, this restructuring of Russia’s political landscape is shortly analyzed by 
focussing on three aspects during Putin’s first two presidential terms (2000-2008): domestic policies, 
opposition elimination and the new composition of elite groups. 
Domestic policies 
Putin’s eagerness to consolidate power led to a rapid introduction of a series of reforms, of which 
three are highlighted next. During the first month of his official appointment, Putin signed a decree 
that divided the 89 Russian provinces into 7 federal districts. As each of these “super-districts” were 
appointed to representatives of the president, this newly introduced policy can be seen as a measure 
that restricted the legislative powers of independent-minded regional leaders (Hahn 2001, 506). Putin 
immediately seized the opportunity to introduce siloviki into his newly defederalized landscape, as 5 
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of the 7 federal districts were appointed to “super-governors” with a force structure background 
(Taylor 2002, 1). These new governors were given the task to supervise and monitor the actions of 
regional leaders and the compliance with federal legislation (Orttung 2001, 343-344). 
Secondly, Putin changed the composition of the Federal Council (upper house) by abolishing the 
automatic membership of regional leaders. This removal of regional chief executives and heads of 
regional legislatures from the Federal Council was accompanied by a new law providing Putin the right 
to dismiss governors and dissolute regional legislature. Putin since 2002 could practically dismiss any 
governor and abolish any regional policy he disliked, even if actions or laws were not contravening 
federal legislature.    
Thirdly, following the Beslan school siege in North Ossetia in 2004 and the ‘Colour Revolutions’ in 
Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005), anti-terrorism measures and increased military 
spending were accompanied by new policies in order to strengthen the Kremlin’s executive authority. 
Governors were no longer popularly elected but instead nominated by the president and approved by 
regional legislatures. In reality, the appointment and approval processes are often considered to be 
both in the Kremlin’s hands (Shiraev 2013, 109). The end of popularly elected governors marked 
another anti-democratic step towards Putin’s new federal landscape. In addition to all the other 
aforementioned anti-federal policies, the rapid power restriction operation of regional heads 
contributed to a recentralized Russia with increased federal dominance.    
Opposition elimination  
Putin’s consolidation of power could not be further expanded without marginalizing a series of 
threatening opposition groups. Next to governors, the alternative obstacles of influence were formed 
by the political opposition, the oligarchs and the independent media (Kryshtanovskaya 2008, 587-
588). The elimination of each of these three groups is shortly discussed, using a number of striking 
examples.   
Through another series of post-Beslan institutional reforms, pressure on political opposition has 
increased heavily since Putin’s second term. These key reforms include stricter regulations regarding 
political party registration (including a required minimum of fifty thousand members), a higher 
electoral threshold for political parties to secure representation in the parliament (increase from 5 to 
7 percent), and the switch from a mixed voting system (half of the seats elected by proportional 
representation, half through single mandate) to a system of merely party-list proportional 
representation (Gel’man 2011, 509). Although the electoral threshold and voting system were again 
reversed a few years before the 2016 parliamentary elections, it has become increasingly difficult for 
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opposition parties to enter the State Duma due to the Kremlin’s grip on the party system. Next to 
these reforms, the relatively competitive elections from the 1990s were replaced by fraud-filled and 
manipulated elections in the 2000s. According to reports from the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), all elections during Putin’s first two terms failed to meet the necessary 
democratic principles (OSCE 2000-2008). This electoral authoritarianism and the isolation of 
opposition resulted in relatively easy victories for Putin and his United Russia party in both 
parliamentary and presidential elections. Additionally, the safety of opposition is not guaranteed after 
the deaths of kremlin critics Alexander Litvinenko (2006) and Boris Nemtsov (2015). Although Kremlin 
involvement has never been proven, the opposition has been given the clear message to act 
cautiously. 
The privatization of the 1990s contributed to take-over of political and economic institutions by a 
group of powerful oligarchs. As it was claimed by prototype oligarch Berezovsky that the seven 
bankers controlled half of Russia’s economy in 1996 (Treisman 2007, 141), Putin’s re-establishment of 
authority required strict control over these business tycoons. Putin made a proposal to the oligarchs: 
as long as they did not interfere with politics and paid taxes properly, their property rights as well as 
the privatization policies from the 1990s would not be harmed (Guriev and Rachinsky 2007, 146). 
Putin opened the attack on opinionated oligarchs and eliminated three of the seven bankers: 
Berezovsky, Gusinsky and Khodorkovsky. Former Sibneft shareholder Berezovsky, who initially 
supported Putin’s presidential campaign, was forced to flee the country and sell his shares after 
criticizing the aforementioned domestic reforms on Russia’s federal system. Gusinsky criticized the 
Kremlin through his media holdings (including the television channel “NTV”) and after a short stay in 
prison, he decided to leave the country and relinquish his property in order to avoid further 
accusations. Probably the most striking case of oligarch elimination involved oil tycoon Khodorkovsky 
and his Yukos company, resulting in an imprisonment of nine years after being charged with tax fraud. 
To briefly mention the role of the siloviki in this process, it is claimed by reports that this controversial 
Yukos affair and the imprisonment of opposition figure Khodorkovsky was initiated by the siloviki 
(Bremmer and Charap 2007, 84). Despite ongoing international criticism of these convictions, Putin’s 
attack ended political interference of oligarchs and contributed to another democratic setback in the 
new Russian political landscape.    
The final challenge for Putin’s power consolidation was formed by the media who enjoyed relative 
freedom in the 1990s. Already during Putin’s first years in office, the Kremlin’s grip on especially 
national television increased and eventually resulted in a state-controlled media imperium including 
six national television networks, two national newspapers and two national radio networks (Russell 
2015, 1). Next to the recapturing of major media outlets, critical journalists who opposed the Kremlin 
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have been suppressed  through manipulation, intimidation and possibly even assassination. The 
politically motivated killings of Kremlin critics Paul Klebnikov (2004) and Anna Politkovskaya (2006) are 
often linked to Putin and his associates, although again there is no clear prove of Kremlin involvement. 
The Kremlin’s actions regarding opposition groups heavily reduced political interference from 
alternative centres of power and completed Putin’s restoration of authority. This marginalized 
opposition could now be replaced by alternative groups of power, strictly selected by Putin.  
New composition of elite groups 
Despite the use of different designations, scholars generally agree that the vacant space has been 
filled by elite groups often referred to as the liberals, the technocrats (or together: the liberal-
technocrats) and the siloviki. The liberal-technocrats, who are mainly economists and lawyers from 
Putin’s hometown St. Petersburg, do emphasize a strong state but believe that the process of 
economic renationalisation must be accomplished slowly and according to the law (Staun 2007, 31). 
They are considered to be brought to the political stage in order to achieve macroeconomic stability 
and a credible relationship with the West (Treisman 2007, 147). The group is headed by former 
president and current prime minister Dimitri Medvedev, and other core members include Vladislav 
Surkov (Putin’s personal advisor), German Gref (head of Sberbank) and Alexei Kudrin (former Minister 
of Finance). 
The siloviki, often considered the strongest of the two (Bremmer and Charap 2007; Rosefielde and 
Hedlund 2008), not only differ from the liberal-technocrats concerning their backgrounds, but also 
their interests and core values. The siloviki emphasize the consolidation of both economic and political 
power by the state, which is authorized to control the economy and the country’s natural resources 
(Bremmer and Charap 2007, 89). Also, they don’t prefer democratic methods of management due to 
the authoritarian and hierarchical structure of their military backgrounds (Kryshtanovskaya 2008, 593). 
Finally, siloviki are not inclined to reconstruct old Soviet institutions, but rather to restore the Soviet 
order (Treisman 2007, 146). In general, the siloviki can thus be considered as more conservative and 
more inclined towards authoritarian policy than the liberal-technocrats. 
An essential question is: why did Putin fill the vacant space of power with siloviki? Putin’s fledgling 
political career desired a group of trustworthy and loyal individuals from non-political sectors. His KGB 
and FSB background provided this group of external supporters of which Putin’s confidence in the 
siloviki clan was politically more significant than his ties with the liberal-technocrats from St. 
Petersburg (Waller 2005, 84). Although some siloviki were already appointed to essential political 
posts before the Putin era (Renz 2006, 905), the total representation of siloviki in key posts heavily 
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increased during Putin’s first two presidential terms. In general, there have been two advanced 
studies on siloviki representation estimates. A 2006 study on Russian elites by sociologist Olga 
Kryshtanovskaya claimed that 78% of Russia’s top 1,016 governmental positions were taken by siloviki 
(Kryshtanovskaya 2006), while in 2003 only 25% of the elite had a security of military background 
(Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003). According to political scientists David W. Rivera and Sharon 
Werning Rivera, these estimates are highly exaggerated as their results show that siloviki 
representation during Putin’s first two terms never exceeded 20.5%. Despite lower results, their study 
as well claims that the influx of siloviki increased during Putin’s first two terms (Rivera and Rivera 
2014). Although these studies present different results, they both prove that the “militarization” and 
“FSB-ization” of power through the entry of security and military veterans turned into a political trend 
during Putin’s first two presidential terms. The next part of this section discusses developments during 
Putin third presidential term that are considered to be closely related to potential shifts in siloviki 
representation.  
1.2 Putin’s return to the presidency  
As it was constitutionally ineligible to rule another term, Putin gave way to one of his greatest 
confidants, Dmitry Medvedev, to succeed him in May 2008. Although Putin officially served as prime 
minister during Medvedev’s first and only presidential term (2008-2012), their actual two-headed rule 
is often labelled as “tandemocracy”(Hale 2009). This duumvirate proved Putin ambitions not to leave 
the political scene and to prepare for another presidential era, but this time his victories during both 
the parliamentary (2011) and presidential elections (2012) were disturbed by mass protests. Tens of 
thousands of people took the streets after fraud-filled elections in 2011, causing the greatest protest 
movement since the collapse of the Soviet Union. After another series of protests following the 2012 
presidential elections, Putin’s seemingly unassailable position was suddenly put under considerable 
pressure. 
To appease the first wave of protesters, Medvedev proposed electoral reforms in 2011 including a 
return to the direct election of regional governors and a simplified process for the registration of new 
political parties and presidential candidates. During Putin’s third term in office, these reforms were 
complemented by the reintroduction of the 5% threshold and the mixed voting system from the 
1990s. Despite this apparent recovery of electoral competition, Putin implemented another series of 
reforms contributing to restrictions in order to restore his unassailable position from his first two 
terms. These measures that were supposed to eliminate every potential new protest movement, 
included severe restrictions on NGOs supporting democracy and human rights, a substantial increase 
in fines for those who participate in “illegal” gatherings, a ban on public meetings close to the former 
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protest areas, foreign media exclusion and internet access limitations (Kramer 2013, 2). Additionally, 
Putin’s anti-opposition campaign evolved into a large number of arrests and imprisonments after the 
protests were beaten down. Striking examples include the arrest of three members of the critical punk 
band Pussy Riot and the house arrest of anti-corruption blogger Alexei Navalny. 
The results of Putin’s aggressive response to the protest movements and other anti-democratic 
policies are reflected in the democracy scores measured by the Economist Intelligence Unit in table 1 
(10=best, 0=worst). It demonstrates that Putin’s eagerness to restrengthen Russia’s vertical power 
structure during his third term contributed to a democratic breakdown. 
Table 1: Democracy scores in Russia 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
4.26 3.92 3.74 3.59 3.39 3.31 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit 
 
Paradoxically, Putin’s democratic breakdown has been accompanied by increased popularity ratings 
since the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 (The Guardian 2015). These favourable approval ratings 
resulted in an overwhelming victory for United Russia in the latest Duma elections (September 2016). 
Despite the opposition’s initial optimism due to the reintroduction of the mixed voting system, United 
Russia gained 23.4% extra seats in the State Duma compared to the 2011 elections (Inter-
Parliamentary Union 2016). Conditions seem ideal in preparation for the presidential elections 
scheduled for March 2018, as Putin will probably maintain his popular mandate.  
The siloviki and Putin’s third term  
Despite the absence of extensive research on siloviki representation during Putin’s third presidential 
term, an increase of siloviki on top positions would be a logical and realistic expectation. As the siloviki 
emphasize the consolidation of political power by the state and are generally considered to be 
loyalists to Putin, this elite group could easily support and develop Putin’s strategy. These thoughts 
have often been shared by various international media, as they have been concluding similar 
expectations: “Kremlin hardliners rule in Putin's Russia” (Deutsche Welle 2014), “The siloviki are 
bankrupting Russia” (The Moscow Times 2015) and “The siloviki coup in Russia” (The American 
Interest 2016). Also, as stated by Rivera and Rivera, the two existing data sets on siloviki 
representation during Putin’s first two terms (by Rivera and Rivera, and Kryshtanovskaya and White), 
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contribute to the expectation of an increased representation continuation during Putin’s third term 
(Rivera and Rivera 2014, 42).  
Still, these claims are not supported by empirical evidence and are merely based on speculations. 
Therefore, a study on siloviki representation during Putin’s third term is highly valuable as it concludes 
findings based on empirical evidence that can assist in further studying elite groups during the Putin 
era. The next two sections serve as a preparation for the positional identification, of which the 
following starts with the formulation of a clear and operational definition of siloviki through a 
literature review.  
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Section 2: Conceptualizing the siloviki  
An important conceptual issue that needs clarification is the formation of a clear definition of siloviki, 
as this section demonstrates that there has been no universally accepted one since its emergence 
shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Originally, “siloviki” is derived from the Russian term 
“silovye struktury’’, which can be translated as “force structures” (Bremmer and Charap 2007, 86). 
This means that a silovik is literally someone who works or used to work for one of the force 
structures. Despite a  small number of similarities, this simple and undetailed definition is often 
interpreted differently by various scholars. It is therefore meaningful to consider what these 
similarities and differences are before a clear definition is formed. Ultimately, this definition should 
offer clear support in determining which positions are occupied by siloviki and which are not in the 
forthcoming sections. 
Essential issues that create vagueness and impreciseness in this definition include the classification of 
types and groups, issues concerning personal backgrounds, and a specific list of force structures that 
helps labelling siloviki. Vice versa, issues that cause little debate and do provide the necessary clarity 
include the core values and the hierarchical clan structure of the siloviki. Through a review of roughly a 
dozen articles on siloviki, discussions on these issues eventually lead to the creation of a central 
definition at the end of this section that is further operationalized throughout this thesis. Due to a 
shortage of literature on siloviki conceptualizations during Putin’s third term, many articles discussed 
in this section date from the 2000s.   
2.1 Agreements in defining siloviki 
In general, there is little disagreement on two aspects in available literature: the common core values 
of the siloviki and the hierarchical clan structure. Scholars that have examined core values generally 
agree that siloviki emphasize a strong state and authoritarian methods of leadership (Bremmer and 
Charap 2007; Kryshtanovskaya 2008; Treisman 2007). All features of siloviki discussed in section one, 
including the siloviki’s promotion of the consolidation of economic power (Bremmer and Charap 2007, 
89), preference of anti-democratic methods of management (Kryshtanovskaya 2008, 593) and the 
desire to restore Soviet order (Treisman 2007, 146), are closely linked to these general core values 
which also show strong similarities with Putin’s political ambitions. 
When it comes to the hierarchical structure during Putin’s three presidential terms, a select group of 
siloviki are often labelled as the ‘core group’ who have been the closest to the president for many 
years. Although some core members have recently ceded power, there is general agreement on the 
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most influential siloviki since Putin’s first presidency, which at least include Sergey Ivanov (former 
deputy prime minister and Chief of Staff), Nikolay Patrushev (Security Council Secretary) and Viktor 
Ivanov (former of Federal Narcotics Control Service) (Bremmer and Charap 2007; Kryshtanovskaya 
2008; Simonov 2006; Staun 2007). Depending on how scholars define siloviki, the only powerful silovik 
which is sometimes questioned is Igor Sechin (Chief Executive Officer of Rosneft). Due to gaps and 
obscurities in his biography, scholars who use definitions of siloviki not focussing purely on 
background but more on interests and values also count him as one of the core members. Secondary 
(and tertiary) members include larger numbers of individuals and have been more various due to 
more changes in the occupations of political posts, but some established examples include Sergey 
Shoigu (Minister of Defense), Alexander Bortnikov (Director of FSB) and Vladimir Yakunin (former 
Head of Russian Railways). As all of the just mentioned names frequently appear when the balance of 
power within the siloviki clan is being discussed, there is no doubt that these siloviki can exert the 
most influence on decisions taken by Putin. Therefore it is not necessary to elaborate further on this 
matter, as well as further exploration of the core values of the siloviki.  
2.2 Discussions in defining siloviki 
In general, there is far more disagreement on a detailed definition of siloviki than factors of 
agreement. The next part of this section discusses a number of widely used conceptualizations of 
siloviki by various scholars who shed different lights on types and groups, the background issue, and a 
specific list of force structures. At the end of this section, some of the most important elements are 
combined in order to formulate a clear and operational definition of siloviki. 
Types and groups 
The first issue leading to disagreement concerns the typology that is used to subdivide siloviki into 
different groups, as scholars tend to use a wide variety of similarities to coalesce various siloviki into 
different groups. For example, Konstantin Simonov distinguishes five subgroups which are often 
headed by members from the core group: the “radical siloviki”, the “personnel men”, the “Lubyanka 
men”, “power businessmen” and the “liberal siloviki”. According to Simonov, the “radical siloviki” are 
those who are the closest to Sechin and emphasize the strongest possible redistribution of economic 
assets. The “personnel men” are the people closest to Viktor Ivanov (former KGB officer and former 
head of the Federal Drug Control Service of Russia) who are accountable for the personnel policy of 
the executive. The “Lubyanka men” (Lubyana: KGB/FSB headquarters) are led by Patruchev and have 
close connections with the FSB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The “power businessmen” are 
represented by the most influential asset holders with Cherkesov as their head. Finally, the “liberal 
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siloviki” headed by Sergey Ivanov don’t emphasize the excessive expansionist ambitions of the power 
elite (Simonov 2006, 11). In contrast to Simonov, Jørgen Staun makes a distinction between two 
groups with different interests: the first group is headed by Sechin and is mainly engaged in domestic 
affairs, and the second group is headed by Sergey Ivanov and is primarily interested in international 
affairs and security matters (Staun 2007, 28). Bettina Renz mentions a distinction between “real 
military figures or field generals” and siloviki of “the heroic type”. The former share lengthy careers as 
officers in the Soviet and Russian armed forces, and the latter share more traditional careers as war 
fighters and commanders of armies (Renz 2006, 914).  
Following these distinctions, it can be noted that various groups within the siloviki clan can be 
differently connected to each other, but in general they are never classified according to their specific 
backgrounds in one of the force structures. As has been mentioned in the introduction, in addition to 
general representation, this thesis also examines what specific force structure backgrounds of the 
siloviki clan are represented the most. Therefore a classification based on force structure backgrounds 
is used in this thesis to link different siloviki, as other interconnecting features are less relevant for the 
purpose of this paper. All other recently mentioned typologies are therefore further omitted. 
The background issue 
The second issue of discussion concerns the concept of ‘backgrounds’ when defining the siloviki. An 
important question that arises is the necessity of a military or security background in order to be 
labelled as a silovik. The majority of definitions, of which many are not very comprehensive, are based 
on compulsory personal involvement in one of the force structures. An important issue of discussion 
in this camp includes the question whether past involvement or past ánd current involvement in 
military and security backgrounds is a prerequisite to be a silovik. For example, former economic 
advisor to Putin Andrei Illarianov defines siloviki as “the people who work for, or who used to work for, 
the silovye ministerstva—literally “the ministries of force”” (Illarionov 2009, 69). This definition omits 
the purely security and military background condition, as current involvement is also sufficient to be a 
member of the siloviki clan. Practically, according to this definition a politician or official who recently 
started serving in one of the force structures with no previous experiences in this sector can be 
labelled a silovik. Renz stresses that only past activities in one of the force ministers are linked to 
siloviki: “Politicians with a force-structure background, who have come to power under the leadership 
of Vladimir Putin” (Renz 2006, 903). Some scholars simply speak of “representatives” and don’t 
mention any periodical conditions. For example, Staun describes siloviki as “representatives from the 
security services and the armed forces” (Staun 2007, 4) and Denis Volkov identically formulates that 
siloviki are “representatives of the military-security establishment” (Volkov 2016). In general, all the 
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aforementioned definitions contradict each other when it comes to the exact ‘timeframe’ of 
backgrounds in one of the force structures. This is an issue that needs clarification in order to avoid 
gaps in the justification of the siloviki selection in the third section.  
A relatively small number of scholars do not emphasize compulsory personal involvement in one of 
the force structures as a requirement to be a silovik. For example, Bremmer and Charap argue that 
many members of the siloviki clan do not meet the requirements as former or current involvement in 
one of the force structures is missing. Therefore a distinction must be made between the literal 
definition of siloviki and its “colloquial” use to describe the group, and Bremmer and Charap do this by 
focussing on common interests rather than on background: “The siloviki are thus united more by 
outlook and interests than by background. The faction is best understood as an informal network of 
government officials and businessmen, led by the core group of Sechin, Ivanov, and Patrushev, who 
share similar political views, pursue a common policy agenda, and seek joint control over economic 
assets” (Bremmer and Charap 2007, 86). This alternative interpretation of the siloviki is partially 
shared by Carolina Vendil Pallin, who states that it is probably unwise to endlessly dig into personal 
backgrounds looking for potential security and military involvement as a group of officials and 
politicians without any provable history in one of the force structures still have played influential roles 
within them. Therefore Pallin makes a distinction between the latter group and the “true” siloviki with 
a force structure background. Also she mentions that despite their significant role in Russian politics it 
can be problematic to study them: “The actual role that they play through their respective positions 
and the influence that they wield in Putin’s circle is more interesting, albeit more difficult, to examine” 
(Pallin 2007, 22).  
Omitting compulsory personal involvement in one of the force structures in order to label siloviki 
means that an alternative list of criteria needs to determined, which should be based on other shared 
features. Additionally, the literal and traditional meaning of siloviki is ignored. The impracticability of 
these conditions is not conducive for the positional identification in this thesis, and therefore the 
traditional meaning of siloviki forms a better and more practical basis as is explained later on. 
Force structures 
Another issue of discussion in the camp that emphasizes the necessity of military or security 
involvement is the question what specific force structures (also often referred to as “force ministries” 
or “power ministries”) confers on an individual the status of a silovik. This is probably the most 
controversial issue concerning definition formation, as specific force structures are either not 
explicated or there is hardly any agreement on the content of the specific list. The composition of the 
list primarily depends on how force structures are defined, although many scholars strangely enough 
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again omit precise definitions in articles covering siloviki. For example, Illarianov does not present any 
specific description and despite his indication of “22” such force ministry agencies he only mentions 
the FSB, agencies associated with the Interior Ministry, various branches of the military, the state 
prosecutor’s office and the intelligence services (Illarionov 2009, 69). Bremmer and Charap define 
force structures as “a reference to the armed services, law enforcement bodies, and intelligence 
agencies that wield the coercive power of the state” (Bremmer and Charap 2007, 86). Finally, Staun 
limits his description by the determination of the armed services, law enforcement structures and 
intelligence agencies as force structures (Staun 2007, 29). As all these definitions of force structures 
are rather imprecise and do not include specific lists of force structure institutions, they can hardly 
serve as operational conceptualizations in further research. 
A smaller number of scholars stress the essence of more preciseness in defining force structures in 
articles related to siloviki, although their definitions are often rather short. The majority of this small 
group links force structure to specific institutions with armed troops under their command. 
Kryshtanovskaya and White define the force structures as “all the government departments that 
include armed formations” (Kryshtanovskaya and White 2009, 298) and Nikolai Petrov states that 
force structures have “thousands of troops at their command” (Petrov 2002, 1). Both Brian D. Taylor 
and Renz add the possible presence of uniformed personnel to their more detailed definition of force 
structures, as Taylor defines force structures as “those state structures, such as ministries and 
agencies, in which some personnel generally wear uniforms and which possess armed units or 
formations” (Taylor 2011, 37), and Renz as “ministries and other institutions within the federal system 
of executive power that have under their command uniformed personnel and/or command their own 
militarized or armed formations” (Renz 2005, 561). These definitions clearly distinguish force structure 
institutions from normal institutions by centralizing the aspects of uniformed personnel and armed 
formations. A critical note could be that definitely not all officials wearing uniforms or carrying arms 
are related to these institutions and not all force structures, including the Foreign Intelligence Service, 
have armed troops under their command (Pallin 2007, 2). 
Pallin approaches force structures differently by focussing on the “presidential block” instead of 
uniformed personnel and armed forces. Her definition appears to be slightly more mysterious, but she 
captures the essence of the Kremlin’s control over subordinated institutions that form the force 
structures: “These institutions constitute a sphere that the ruler in the Kremlin is determined to 
control since they constitute vital instruments of gaining and holding power” (Pallin 2007, 3). This 
definition includes institutions that are often not referred to as force structures by other scholars, like 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Directorate for Administrative Affairs.  
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When analyzing the attached lists of force structure institutions by Kryshtanovskaya and White, Renz, 
Pallin and Taylor, it appears that all lists slightly differ from each other. However, there is a set of five 
bodies included in all lists and these can therefore be considered ‘the core’ of the force structures:    
1. The Ministry of Defence  
2. Federal Security Service  
3. The Ministry of Internal Affairs 
4. The Ministry for Emergency Situations 
5. The Federal Protective Service 
Generally, there seems to be no consensus on around ten institutions, of which the most important 
ones include the Ministry of Justice, the Foreign Intelligence Service and the State Courier Service. 
Except for some specifically mentioned bodies of larger institutions, is it barely clarified why these 
scholars have chosen to include certain institutions in their list and others not. Only Taylor explicitly 
explains why he, for example, includes institutions like the Federal Customs Service and the Procuracy. 
His selection is determined on the basis of post-Soviet bodies that emerged from the three main force 
structures from the Soviet era: the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB. 
Also, he mentions the approximate size of the institutions in terms of personnel in 2007, and it 
appears that, indeed, all five institutions listed above are among the largest force structures. 
Therefore these key institutions are clearly inseparable from siloviki when it comes to labelling 
through their backgrounds. 
2.3 Definition formation 
The aforementioned overview of the most significant arguments and debates concerning the 
conceptualization of siloviki is now to be converted into a clearly defined and operational definition. 
As concluded before, there is much agreement on the hierarchical clan structure and core values of 
the siloviki, and therefore the common features concerning these issues have previously been 
determined. Issues that do need clarification in order to conduct the positional identification include 
the concept of backgrounds and the composition of a specific list of force structures that can assist in 
classifying the siloviki into different groups.   
 
The central question regarding the issue of siloviki backgrounds is the necessity of a military or  
security background in order to be labelled as a silovik. If such a military or security background is not 
required, then what specific outlooks and interests would classify someone as a silovik? And if a 
politician or official shares these values only to a certain extent, then what qualifications are 
applicable? In order to avoid another grey area in addition to the already existing confusion about 
siloviki, it is most convenient to qualify siloviki according to provable bibliographic information. As the 
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positional analysis requires provable data, siloviki in this thesis are merely united by security and 
military backgrounds, and not by outlook and interests. It would be practically impossible to assign the 
siloviki status to individuals based on their ideas, as examinations would be mainly grounded on 
assumptions. Siloviki labelling through provable bibliographic information is therefore much more 
convenient and practicable. Secondly, this condition of united security and military backgrounds only 
applies to elites with past involvement in one of the force structures. As stated before, current 
involvement would imply that every politician or official working in one of the force structures is a 
silovik and this would result into a suspiciously large representation of siloviki in top-level positions. 
The second main issue of discussion concerns the force structures and the composition of a specific 
list of institutions. It can be concluded that all relevant definitions of force structures include an 
unquestionable set of five institutions that are considered to be the key force structure bodies. This 
concrete list of the five most significant force structure institutions provides a framework that is 
practicable for the positional analysis in the fourth section, as there is plenty of information and data 
available about these institutions which will ease the search for possible backgrounds of politicians 
and officials in any of these bodies. As the list includes the most essential bodies, it is irrelevant to 
endlessly discuss all the other potential force structures institutions as they in all probability will not 
contribute to significant research differences and are therefore further omitted. 
A combination of all the discussed elements leads to a clear and operational definition of siloviki that 
is sufficient for further research in this thesis: 
Politicians and officials on key positions of power united by past involvement in one of the force 
structures, which include the Ministry of Defence, Federal Security Service, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, the Ministry for Emergency Situations and the Federal Protective Service. 
Additionally, there is a small number of strict conditions that need to be clarified following this 
definition. First of all, as this thesis mainly focusses on top-level positions of power, the 
conceptualization of siloviki is restricted to these high level positions which are discussed in section 
two. Secondly, as security and military backgrounds must be linked to a certain extent of working time 
in one of the force structure, working experience is set at a minimum of one year. Thirdly, there is no 
distinction made between specific positions hold in the past when it comes to the classification 
criteria. Fourthly, the Ministry of Defence includes the armed forces (established in 1992) as this 
military service is considered an integral part of the Defence Ministry. Finally, the key positions of 
power need to be determined in order to mobilize the definition of siloviki, which is the general part of 
the next section.  
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Section 3: Positional selection  
This section intends to answer the following question: what positions from the Russian political system 
can be classified as the most influential? With the exception of some indisputable positions from the 
executive branch of power, it is rather challenging to prove dominance of one position over another 
due to Russia’s thick network of informal governance and increasingly consolidated presidential 
power. Therefore positions are selected through a set of measurable criteria introduced later on in 
this section. In order to eventually form a concrete list of positions, a brief introduction to the Russian 
political system with a focus on the three branches of governmental power is helpful and therefore 
covered in the first part of this section. It intends to show that, due to the nature of the Russian 
political system, the executive branch is the main supplier of power positions. The second part 
discusses a number of issues regarding the positional selection that need to be clarified. These include 
the selection framework and the quantity of positions that are to be selected. Finally, the third part 
discusses and selects the most important positions that are to be identified in the next section.  
3.1 The separation of powers  
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the communist regime had to be replaced by a new 
governmental system including a new constitution. Triggered by democratic aspirations, Boris Yeltsin 
generated a wave of optimism, but high expectations were soon replaced by chaos and disorder 
through economic and political hardship. Following a boisterous period in which Yeltsin and the 
parliament struggled violently, the outcomes of the 1993 constitutional crisis laid the foundation for 
the current Russian state. The new constitution, adopted through a national referendum in December 
1993, established a post-Soviet system with extended presidential powers and increased control over 
the legislative. Some essential consequences in favour of the president include the practical 
impossibility of removing the president from its office, a severe limitation on mechanisms ensuring 
checks and balances, and the president’s ability to appoint key officials and submit proposals (draft 
laws) to the State Duma. Since the adoption of the constitution, Russia’s semi-presidential system 
further expanded into what is often labelled as “superpresidential” (Colton and Skach 2005, 120). This 
expansion is characterized by an executive body with extensive bureaucratic power tools, leadership 
based on presidential decrees, and formal and informal presidential monitoring of governmental 
bodies (Protsyk 2003, 428).   
After his inauguration, Putin’s initial promise to establish a “dictatorship of the law” was soon 
exchanged by an intensification of the superpresidential system: a strong centralisation and 
personalization of power, deeply flawed democratic institutions, a lack of a multiparty political system, 
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and high levels of corruption. In general, there have been three consequences of Putin’s authoritarian 
politics for Russia’s political system which are important for the positional map-out of this section. 
First of all, Putin’s consolidation of power contributed to the building of a very strong executive 
branch. This transformation has barely left room for limitations of presidential power nor for 
institutional power checks by other branches. As a result, a substantial part of the top-level positions 
that are analyzed in the next section emerge from the executive branch, as they are the closest to the 
main source of power: the president. Secondly, the authoritative executive has severely weakened the 
exercise of power by the relatively toothless legislative body. Additionally, by repeatedly creating a 
pro-Kremlin majority in the legislative branch, Putin has expanded his executive body with 
considerable control over the legislature. Thirdly, Russia’s court system is also affected by the 
executive as judicial independence has been under great pressure. Disputable trials against, for 
example, political enemies have contributed to international criticism on the quality of the court 
system. As both the legislative and judicial have been limitedly able to counter-balance the presidents 
hierarchy, a relatively small number of positions is selected from these branches. 
3.2 Pre-selection issues  
A number of issues concerning the selection of positions need careful consideration. First of all, an 
important question is whether the selection should be limited to positions derived from the 
governmental branches, as a powerful fourth branch needs to be assessed as well: state-owned 
enterprises. As the privatization and the economic restructuring of the 1990s was replaced by 
increased state-ownership during the Putin era, major businesses in the media, banking and energy 
sectors were gradually incorporated by the government. By structurally increasing the assets of state-
owned enterprises, the share of the state sector in the economy has ever since increased heavily. In 
2015, around 55% of the economy was controlled by the state, and 28% of the workforce directly 
employed by the government (Aven 2015). As the state’s role as the guardian of the economy has 
recovered and many highly influential positions within the most powerful of these enterprises have 
ever since been held by political officials, it is indispensable to include state-owned enterprises in the 
scope of selection. 
Secondly, the quantity of elite positions that are to be identified needs to be determined. In contrast 
to the studies on siloviki representation by Kryshtanovskaya and White, and Rivera and Rivera, this 
thesis does not focus on total siloviki representation but rather on representation in the most 
influential positions. Whereas Kryshtanovskaya and White and Rivera and Rivera examined a wide 
scope of elites by identifying around 1000 individuals, research in this thesis is based on a significantly 
smaller number of positions. The main reason for this is because elite positions differ greatly in 
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importance and therefore a smaller number of more equivalent top-level positions indicates siloviki 
domination more accurately than total representation in positions that greatly differ in the power 
hierarchy. Through a selection of a small group of top-level posts that, with some minor exceptions, 
have existed throughout 2000-2016, the difficulty of weighting different categories of positions 
according to degrees of influence is avoided as key positions can be more easily counted as equal. 
Therefore a selective group of 21 positions is filtered from the most powerful institutional bodies. The 
selection of these positions is justified in the next part. 
3.3 Mapping top-level positions  
As the pre-selection conditions are now set, the positional selection through brief discussions of the 
most significant positions from the main bodies of the three branches of power and state-owned 
enterprises is covered in the next part. The actual domination of these bodies and positions is 
discussed by using four branches and one additional source of power: the president, the executive, 
the legislative, the judiciary, and state-owned enterprises. Positions are ultimately selected through 
criteria formulated by the author that are arguably strongly linked to the nature of the Russian 
political system. These include direct involvement of the president considering the appointment and 
nomination of politicians and officials for the respective positions, certain restrictions on the actual 
level of influence due to close interaction with the president (although their ‘formal’ power is 
supposed to be significant according to, for example, the constitution), and a relatively close (working) 
relationship with the president or other influential members from the higher ranks of the executive. 
As demonstrated later, the selected positions all meet these criteria to various degrees although not 
every aspect is equally measurable. Only eligible senior positions are discussed as it is unnecessary and 
nearly impossible to cover all offices, and contestable positions in mainly the legislative are covered in 
greater detail in order to better justify final choices. As has been stated before, due to difficulties in 
proving power dominance of certain positions over others, the selected list is subjective and different 
interpretations of power influence and selection criteria could have led to different lists of positions. 
Still, the list in this thesis generally contains positions that would also have been included in selections 
from many other political systems. In order to summarize the findings, an overview of the 21 selected 
positions is included at the end of this section (table 5).  
The president 
According to the 1993 Constitution, the President of the Russian Federation (1) is the head of the state 
and the protector of the rights and freedoms of the Russian citizens. Since 2012, presidential terms 
have been extended from four to six years with a maximum of two consecutive terms. The president 
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appoints the prime minister (by agreement with the State Duma) and federal ministers and nominates 
the chairperson of the Central Bank, the Prosecutor General and the judges of the Constitutional 
Court, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Arbitration Court. As the president also possesses 
significant legislative and judicial powers in addition to its superior executive capacity, a vast number 
of closely connected confidants is needful as it would be nearly impossible to exercise them all alone 
(Shiraev 2013, 97). 
One of these key bodies is the president’s executive office, the Presidential Administration, which 
possibly is the most powerful institution in Russian politics (Bremmer and Charap 2007, 87). This body 
is responsible for preparing and drafting laws, monitoring federal legislation and government activity, 
and briefing the press and organisations abroad. More than 2,000 officials constitute the Presidential 
Administration that operates directly under the president and independently of the government. The 
head of this powerful institution, the Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration (2), is considered 
to be the second most influential individual source of power after the president (Waller 2005, 33). 
Prominent politicians including Sergei Ivanov, Dmitry Medvedev and Alexander Voloshin have filled 
this position that allows direct access to the president. Due to the political dominance and the size of 
the Presidential Administration, not only the chief of staff is included in the list of key positions, but 
also the First Deputy Chief of Staff (3). As both positions are appointed by the president, he has the 
ability to control and fill two key posts with loyalists who can just as easily be dismissed again. For 
example, one of Putin’s closes allies, Sergey Ivanov, was unexpectedly dismissed as chief of staff in 
august 2016 after decades of serving in Putin’s inner circle.  
Next to the Presidential Administration, another powerful body close to the President is the Security 
Council. This consultative body responsible for analyzing national security matters consists of 30 
members including the heads of security-related ministries and agencies, and is chaired by the 
president and overseen by the Secretary of the Security Council (4). The latter, appointed by the 
president, has the task to ensure that all the involved ministries and agencies remain loyal to the 
Kremlin by monitoring instructions implemented by the president. As the Security Council is composed 
of merely heads of other institutions of which many are already selected, only the Secretary as 
representative from the Security Council is included in the list. 
The executive 
The Government of the Russian Federation is composed of the prime minister, deputy ministers and 
federal ministers. Its main tasks include the preparations on and execution of the federal budget, the 
implementation of federal policies, the protection of property and freedoms of its citizens, and the 
prevention of crime (Shiraev 2013, 101). The head of the government, the Prime Minister of the 
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Russian Federation (5), officially serves as the second most powerful official in the Russian political 
system, but due to the heavy consolidation of power under Putin’s presidency, the prime minister’s 
role is more restricted than in other semi-presidential systems. However, as has been mentioned 
before, Putin’s role as prime minister during Medvedev’s presidential term temporarily changed from 
a subordinate power to a politically dominant power, as in fact he was doing most of the steering on 
the tandem with Medvedev (Duncan 2013, 2). The prime minister is backed-up by a First Deputy Prime 
Minister (6) and a shifting number of Deputy Prime Ministers (7), who are proposed by the prime 
minister and other federal ministers and appointed by the president. These deputies assist on the 
coordination and management of the work of the federal executive bodies (Willerton 2014, 31). The 
deputy prime ministers may temporarily takeover the position as prime minister in his or her absence, 
and therefore these positions definitely require examination. 
As for the government’s ministers (21 in 2016), a clear distinction must be made between ministries 
accountable to the president and ministries that report to the prime minister. The first group is 
considered to be the most powerful and includes the Ministry for Emergency Situations (8), the 
Ministry of Justice (9), the Ministry of Defence (10), the Ministry of Internal Affairs (11) and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (12) (Shiraev 2013, 102). As previously stated, these ministries are often 
considered to be part of the force structures and are therefore closely linked to the siloviki. Also, the 
Ministers of Defence, Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs are members of the Security Council. All the 
other ministries have been more frequently subjected to institutional reform and have therefore been 
less sustainable. Consequently, due to their subordinate role in combination with many splits, mergers 
and dissolvements during Putin’s presidencies, it is rather irrelevant to examine them.  
 
The last major set of bodies from the executive branch consist of a number of Federal Services and 
Agencies. They don’t operate fully independently as their activities are overseen by the president. Two 
of these services need close attention: the Federal Security Service (FSB) (13) and the Foreign 
Intelligence Service (SVR) (14). These two organizational successors of the former KGB, as well as the 
five afore-mentioned ministries, are considered to be part of the force structures and their directors, 
appointed by the president, are members of the Security Council. The FSB is responsible for 
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, surveillance of the military, and all other operations concerning 
national security at home and abroad. Under Putin’s presidency, the successor of the Soviet KGB has 
regained some of the former KGB tasks that were ceded to separate agencies during the 1990s (Taylor 
2011, 57). Some of them include the incorporation of the Federal Border Guard Service and the 
Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information. Officially designed to improve the 
FSB’s efficiency, much of the former powers have consequently been restored and many positions 
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have been filled by Putin’s former FSB/KGB associates. The power of the FSB penetrates several areas 
beyond national security, as is has been given the additional task to protect Putin’s political regime 
(Soldatov and Borogan 2010) and the ability to even influence judicial decisions (Walther 2014, 673). 
Despite a general lack of statistical information on secret services like the FSB, rough estimates 
suggest that it employs a total of more than 300,000 personnel  (Lucas 2013, 68). Even a further 
reinforcement of the FSB is realistic, as a recent article by the Russian newspaper Kommersant 
announced a plan for a possible merger between the FSB and SVR into the “Ministry of State Security 
of Russia” (Kommersant 2016). Due to the FBS’s restored power reputation under Putin, the director 
of this service is included in the list of top-level positions.       
In contrast to the FSB, the SVR is responsible for the protection of the state from external threats by 
conducting foreign intelligence operations. The service has two main tasks: analyzing all gathered 
information related to essential security interests, and the assisting with and conducting of measures 
to ensure national security (Shiraev 2013, 296-297). Just like the FSB, the SVR directly reports to the 
president and has the responsibility to protect state secrets. It has a personnel of 13,000 (Jones and 
Kovacich 2015, 208), which makes in it comparison to the FSB a relatively small service. In spite of its 
small size, the service and its authorizations form a crucial body concerning Russia’s national security 
and therefore the Director of the SVR is indispensable for the positional analysis. 
The legislative 
Russia’s legislative branch requires a more detailed analysis compared to the forceful executive, as the 
choice to omit members of parliament needs to be justified. Russia’s parliament, the Federal 
Assembly, consist of two chambers: the State Duma and the Federation Council. The 450-seat State 
Duma is the lower house of the Federal Assembly and its deputies are directly elected for a five year 
term by the Russian citizens; half of the seats by proportional representation and the other half 
through single mandate since the latest elections in 2016. The jurisdiction of the Duma is defined by 
the Russian Constitution, which includes decision making on the confidence in the government, 
approving the appointment of the Chairman of the Government by the president, hearing reports 
from the government regarding the results of its work, appointing and dismissing the heads of some 
independent organizations including the Chairman of the Central Bank, the granting of amnesty, and 
advancing accusations against the president for his impeachment (Article 103 of the Constitution of 
the Russian Federation 1993). Furthermore, the Duma has the “legislative initiative” which provides 
the opportunity to introduce proposals (draft laws) and adopt or reject federal laws. 
These constitutional powers are overshadowed by the presidential ability to dissolve the Duma under 
specific circumstances and the rejection of certain laws passed by the legislature. Vice versa, 
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impeachment of the president is almost impossible to achieve in practice and the Duma’s power to 
dissolve the government is strongly limited as well. In contrast to the relatively influential and 
competitive parliament shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, the 1993 Constitution and Putin’s 
additional power consolidation have caused a significant shift in the balance of power in the 
president’s favour. This shift has been further enhanced by competitive restrictions in the Duma 
through its unchanging composition since parliamentary elections in 2003, as Putin’s United Russia has 
been constantly holding large numbers of seats. Election results and the domination of United Russia 
in the Duma are demonstrated in the following table:  
 
                    Table 2: Results of parliamentary elections under Putin and Medvedev (% of total seats) 
 2003 2007 2011 2016      
United Russia 49.6 70 52.9 76.2 
Communist 
Party 
11.6 12.7 20.4 9.3 
Liberal 
Democratic 
Party 
8 8.9 12.5 8.7 
A Just Russia - 8.4 14.2 5.1 
Other 30.8 - - 0.7 
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union 
United Russia has ever since been accompanied in the Duma by parties often referred to as the 
“systemic opposition” in literature  and media, which include the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia and A Just Russia. These parties are committed to 
counteract certain policies but they are generally not seeking for major regime changes (Gel’man 
2015, 178). This block is therefore nothing more than a semblance of opposition that is eventually 
mainly operating under the Kremlin’s command. Due to the presidential influence on the legislative 
and the relatively powerless role of the systemic opposition, seats in the State Duma are not regarded 
as influential within the Russian political system.  
 
However, the Chairman of the State Duma (15), or the Speaker of the State Duma, arguably fills a key 
position due to his or her relatively independent stance in the Duma (Roudik 2011). The chairman is 
elected by members of the State Duma and has the responsibility to monitor Duma sessions, 
communicate interests of the executive, and represent the Duma in its cooperation with other 
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domestic institutional bodies, and states and organisations abroad. As all the chairs under Putin and 
Medvedev since 2003 have been represented by United Russia members, both the activities in the 
Duma and interaction with the executive and the judiciary is organized and controlled by pro-Kremlin 
deputies (Danks 2009, 157). The position as Chairman of the State Duma can thus be considered as 
superior to the other Duma members, and is therefore included in the list. 
The least prominent of the two chambers of parliament, the Federation Council, is the upper house of 
the Federal Assembly and consists of two representatives from each of the 85 subjects (number of 
subjects has often changed) of the Russian Federation, including the Republic of Crimea and 
Sevastopol (2). Originally, representatives where directly elected but since Putin’s early reforms each 
subject sends two senators for a non-fixed term either elected by the regional legislature or 
nominated by regional administrators. This system has often been criticized as mainly the Kremlin 
controls these “undemocratic” appointments (Shiraev 2013, 127-128). Some of the most important 
constitutional powers of the Federation Council include the approval of border changes between 
subjects of the Russian Federation, deciding on the possibility of using the Armed Forces outside the 
territory of the Russian Federation, impeachment of the President of the Russian Federation, and the 
appointment of judges of all courts and the Procurator-General (Article 102 of the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation 1993). Next to its subnational powers, the Federation Council has the responsibility 
to approve or reject federal laws passed by the Duma and supervise parliamentary activity. In practice, 
the Council spends limited time on actual floor debates and voting rounds always easily result in 
favour of the president (Remington 2014). The 170-seat Federation Council used to act as a 
representing voice of the regions, but due to Putin’s defederalization politics (discussed in section 
one), the Council has been deregionalized and its independence has additionally been affected 
through the large numbers of seats taken by United Russia members (Ross and Turovsky 2013, 62). As 
the Federation Council, just like the State Duma, has become an extension of Putin’s power, regular 
seats in the Council are not considered as key positions in this thesis. 
However, the Chairman of the Federation Council (16) is included in the list as it arguably is the third 
most powerful political post in Russia after the president and prime minister, as in the case of 
incapacity of both the chairman of the Federation Council becomes the acting president. The 
chairman is elected by the Council’s senators and presides over sessions, coordinates activities, 
controls the internal schedule, and is a member of the Security Council. The chairs of the State Duma 
and the Federation Council are considered to be the only posts of influence in the legislative, and all 
other positions (including regional powers) struggle to play any significant role. Besides, as all the 
single seats in the State Duma and the Federal Council basically have equal power, they should 
definitely all be excluded.  
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The judiciary 
The legal basis for judicial reforms after the collapse of the Soviet Union was formed by the 1993 
Constitution which states that the judiciary, just like the executive and legislative, operates as an 
independent branch. The judicial branch is charged with the interpretation and application of the  law, 
and the Supreme Court (expanded with tasks of the dissolved Supreme Arbitration Court since 2014) 
and the Constitutional Court are on top of the judicial hierarchy. The final court of appeal, the 
Supreme Court, is the highest court for criminal, economic, civil and administrative cases and mainly 
supervises and reviews the activities of courts according to procedural forms. It consists of 170 judges 
nominated by the president and appointed by the Federation Council. The Constitutional Court is the 
judicial body that protects the Constitution and reviews whether certain laws or decrees fit within this 
jurisdiction. For example, it constituted decisions on the government’s use of military force in 
Chechnya in 1995 and Putin’s federal reforms in 2005 (Shiraev 2013, 139). The court consists of 19 
judges who are appointed in the same way as the judges from the Supreme Court.  
Despite many reforms since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the credibility and quality of the Russian 
court system still leaves room for improvement. Both a lack of independence of judges and a lack of 
public thrust in the judicial system are among its main weaknesses (International Commission for 
Jurists 2010, 6). Especially the lack of public trust due to the Kremlin’s influence on the appointment 
and decisions of judges has contributed to public distrust in Russia’s judiciary. According to a survey 
conducted by Levada-Center, public confidence in the judicial system in 2015 (table 3) was even the 
lowest of all institutions discussed in this section (Levada-Center 2015). Therefore, the Kremlin’s ability 
to abuse the court system has arguably added a political dimension to the judicial branch, as court 
decisions can be steered from above. The biggest victim is the political opposition, which has suffered 
from disputable trials through bribery and intimidation of juries. As mentioned before, some examples 
of disputable cases include the Navalny  and Khodorkovsky trials that demonstrated the Kremlin’s 
effective interference.   
The head of the Supreme Court, The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (17), 
and the head of the Constitutional Court, the Chairman of the Constitutional Court (18), are both 
appointed for a six-year term by the Federation Council after the president’s nomination. Their main 
tasks include the representation of their courts in relationships with state bodies and the public, 
supervising and overseeing activities of judges and preside over plenary sessions, and the allocation of 
responsibilities among its deputies. Additionally, the Chief Justice has the right to participate in the 
sessions of the State Duma, the Federation Council and the government. As both posts form essential 
extensions of the Kremlin’s ability to influence court decisions, they are included in the list. 
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The final judicial body of importance is the Prosecution Office, which is charged with the supervision 
over the execution of laws by authorities, human rights and freedoms. Also, the Prosecution Office has 
the responsibility to prosecute in behalf of the state, and challenge court decisions. The head of the 
Prosecution Office, the Prosecutor General of Russia (19), is appointed in the same way as the heads of 
the two courts and coordinates the activities of the Prosecution Office. Although the Prosecution 
Office officially operates independent from the all the three branches of power, the full judicial 
independence is again questionable as there have been several signs that the Russian procuracy is 
guided by politics instead of law (Burger and Holland 2008). For example, the procuracy has largely 
been responsible for the controversial charges against Khodorkovsky, which arguably demonstrates its 
alliance with the Kremlin. Therefore, for the same reasons as the heads of the two highest courts, the 
chair of this body is qualified as a key position.  
Table 3: Trust in Russian institutions in 2015 (%): “To what degree, in your opinion, can you trust..” 
 Fully trust Partially 
trust 
Not at all 
trust 
Difficult to 
say 
The president 80 11 7 3 
Security 
agencies 
50 25 11 15 
The government 45 32 17 7 
The Federation 
Council 
40 33 14 13 
The State Duma 40 33 14 13 
The courts 29 37 20 15 
Note: presence of statistical error (not exceeding 1%) 
Source: Levada-Center 
 
State-owned enterprises 
As mentioned before, the Putin era replaced the large-scale privatization of the 1990s by increased 
state-ownership of enterprises active in strategically important sectors. This transition from “crony 
capitalism” to “state capitalism” (Djankov 2015, 3) commenced with the nationalization of 
Khodorkovsky’s Yukos, and further expanded with structurally increased state-ownership in the 
energy, media and banking sectors. As a result, the most powerful Russian companies in especially the 
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energy sector have been subjected to coercive takeovers by the state, and in many cases political 
officials have been holding key positions in these state-owned companies.  
Two of these state-owned companies in the energy sector stand out: Gazprom and Rosneft. According 
to the Fortune Global 500, total revenues of these two companies in the energy sector in 2016 (see 
table 4) significantly surpassed the total revenues of other major Russian companies (with the 
exception of Lukoil). In addition to profit maximization, these companies have been serving for 
political purposes since the Kremlin’s intervention in the 2000s. Decisions on Russia’s energy supplies 
are therefore steered by “supreme arbitrer” Putin (Baev 2014, 3). One of the few exceptions of state 
intervention, Lukoil, belongs to the biggest private companies in Russia and is therefore not further 
discussed. 
Table 4: Top five firms in Russia according to total revenues in 2016 (USD million) 
 Total Revenues 
($M) 
World Rank  
1. Gazprom 99,464 56 
2. Lukoil 84,677 76 
3. Rosneft 64,749 118 
4. Sberbank 45,608 199 
5. VTB Bank 22,449 478 
Source: Fortune Global 500 
The largest natural gas company in the world, Gazprom, controls the largest gas reserves in the world, 
owns the largest pipeline system in the world, and supplies gas to more than 30 countries (Gazprom 
2016). As the Russian state owns just over 50% of the company’s shares (Ibid.), ultimate state control 
of Russia’s biggest company provides a political and economic weapon that has been essential in 
shaping foreign policy through, especially, Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. Since the state’s 
majority ownership (2006), minority shareholders have played no significant role in the governance of 
the company (Moe and Kryukov 2013). The Board of Directors (11 individuals in 2016) is the directing 
body within Gazprom that is in charge of all activities except for the issues in hands of the supreme 
governing body: the General Meeting of Shareholders (Gazprom 2016). As these shareholders are 
mainly represented by statesmen due to the majority state-ownership, the Kremlin has ultimate 
control over final decisions. Members of the Board of Directors are elected by the General Meeting of 
Shareholders, and the Chairman and Deputy Chairman by the Board of Directors itself for an unfixed 
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term. According to the official regulations of Gazprom, the Chairman of the Gazprom Board of 
Directors (20) is responsible for organizing and chairing meetings of the Board of Directors and the 
General Shareholders, signing contracts with Management Committee, and the keeping of minutes 
during meetings (Gazprom: Regulation on Board of Directors 2016, 5). It is rather obvious that this 
position and others within the Board of Directors have been filled by Kremlin loyalists and therefore 
the chairman is included in the list of key positions. 
Russia’s second largest oil company according to total revenues, Rosneft, is the biggest oil producer in 
Russia, holds the biggest reserves in Russia, and nearly 70% of its shares are in hands of the state 
(Rosneft 2016). Its dominant position in the oil sector has been especially obtained through the looting 
of Yukos assets between 2004-2007. The organizational and electoral structure of Rosneft is 
comparable to Gazprom, with the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Rosneft (21) and his or her 
deputies on top of the Board of Directors. As many of the highest positions in the Board of Directors 
have been filled by one of Putin’s closest allies, Igor Sechin, this body can definitely not be omitted. 
Table 5: Overview of selected positions 
The executive 
1. President 
2. Chief of Staff 
3. First Deputy Chief of Staff 
4. Security Council Secretary 
5. Prime Minister 
6. First Deputy Prime Minister 
7. Deputy Prime Minister 
8. Minister for Emergency 
Situations 
9. Minister of Justice 
10. Minister of Defence 
11. Minister of Internal Affairs 
12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
13. Director of FSB 
14. Director of SVR 
The legislative  
15. State Duma Chairman 
16. Federation Council 
Chairman 
 
The judiciary 
17. Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court 
18. Chairman of the 
Constitutional Court 
19. Prosecutor General 
 
State-owned enterprises 
20. Gazprom Chairman 
21. Rosneft Chairman 
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Section 4: Positional analysis  
The content and results of the main study on siloviki representation are discussed in this final section. 
The complete datasets derived from the positional identification are included in the appendix and 
form the main source of this section. The first part serves as a brief overview of the study and explains 
how the positional identification has been conducted. The second part presents a set of concluding 
tables and figures derived from the results of the positional identification followed by a brief 
discussion of these findings. The third part elaborates on these findings and concludes some of the 
main indications and prospects, in particular by focusing on the upcoming presidential elections 
scheduled for 2018. In general, this section demonstrates that siloviki representation during Putin’s 
third term has dropped compared to his earlier terms, and this indicates that there is no clear link 
between increased authoritarianism and increased siloviki domination on key positions. 
4.1 Explanation of study  
The positional identification in the appendix requires some explanation regarding the method of 
labelling. In total, 21 positions have been occupied by 60 different individuals starting from May 2000 
until October 2016. The backgrounds of all of these individuals have been checked through available 
bibliographical data according to Russian governmental sources (in English), academic articles and 
books, and international media. When an individual meets the conditions determined in section two 
according to numerous sources, he or she is labelled as a ‘confirmed’ silovik including a reference to 
his or her specific background (classification) in one of the power ministries. When backgrounds of 
certain individuals are disputable through the lack of a clear bibliographical confirmation or different 
interpretations, the person is given the status of an ‘alleged’ silovik. Finally, early resignations for any 
reason as well as temporarily occupied positions are indicated as they influence representation 
calculations.  
4.2 Positional analysis results  
The results of the positional analysis are presented in four separate parts that all respond to the 
research question by focussing on specific elements. The first part discusses results on siloviki 
representation during Putin’s third term compared to earlier terms and responds to the main research 
question of this thesis. The next three parts provide additional findings on elements that have 
received limited attention in previous studies: classification according to specific backgrounds, 
dominance in certain bodies, and length of services. All the figures and tables used in this section are 
derived from the positional identification in the appendix and the three theories on political influence 
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of siloviki mentioned in the introduction of this thesis (the orthodox school, the critical school and the 
revisionist school) are included in the discussions of the results. When required, results are compared 
to the findings by Kryshtanovskaya, and Rivera and Rivera which have been discussed in the first 
section. 
Siloviki representation  
The datasets from the appendix show that from the 60 individuals studied, 12 have been identified as 
‘confirmed’ siloviki (including Putin) and 5 as ‘alleged’ siloviki. During the examined period, annual 
occupation of confirmed siloviki has been remarkably steady as the total amount on key positions has 
varied between 6 and 7 per year. When adding the alleged siloviki, the total amount has varied 
between 8 and 11. Despite these relatively small margins, the total annual occupation of key positions 
including siloviki ranged from 19 to 29 individuals, and therefore the actual representation 
percentages show more shifts. In order to conduct a comparative analysis of the data, representation 
percentages have been calculated through a division of the total annual occupation of individuals by 
the number of siloviki on these posts. On the annual basis, when an individual resigned early from a 
specific position, different calculations have been used. For example, when a silovik on a specific 
position resigned and was replaced by another silovik, this situation does not count as a double siloviki 
occupation but as one. Furthermore, acting positions are not included in the calculations as they are 
not considered as a full-scale occupation. Results are reflected in the following figure, which shows the 
annual percentages of key positions occupied by siloviki during 2000-2016: 
 
Figure 1: Annual percentages of top-level positions occupied by siloviki during 2000-2016. 
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The figure illustrates a number of crucial representation trends that need to be discussed. First of all, 
when analyzing annual rates under Putin’s presidency, siloviki representation peaked during Putin’s 
second term, when in 2006 33.3% of all key positions were occupied by confirmed siloviki. In 2016, 
representation under Putin’s presidency was the lowest, as only 22.4% of the positions were occupied 
by confirmed siloviki. Overall, representation of confirmed siloviki was the lowest during Medvedev’s 
term as percentages varied from 21.4% to 23.1%. Secondly, when analyzing complete terms, siloviki 
representation under Putin’s presidency was the highest during his second term and the lowest during 
his third term, and overall the lowest under Medvedev’s term. Finally and most importantly for the 
purpose of this thesis, the figure indicates that siloviki representation in top-level positions has 
declined during Putin’s third term compared to his earlier terms, with Medvedev’s term as an 
exception. This trend applies to both the confirmed, and the confirmed and alleged siloviki, which 
generally show similar shifts with some minor exceptions. As previously stated, variation in the total 
number of positions per year (19-29) rather than shifts in the total number of siloviki (8-11) on these 
positions explain the shifts in the representation percentages.  
When comparing these results to earlier studies on total representation, the findings by Rivera and 
Rivera show the biggest overlap as they stated that total representation during Putin’s first two terms 
never exceeded 20.5%. Kryshtanovskaya’s results strongly deviate from both Rivera and Rivera and 
results from the study in this thesis (33.3% in 2006), as she claimed that 78% of Russia’s top 1,016 
governmental positions were taken by siloviki in 2006. Although the study in this thesis has identified a 
considerably smaller scope of individuals, Kryshtanovskaya’s findings, as Rivera and Rivera argued, 
indeed seem highly exaggerated (Kryshtanovskaya 2006; Rivera and Rivera 2014). Therefore the 
critical school theory, which argues that the large-scale influx of siloviki is exaggerated, is applicable to 
siloviki representation in key positions not merely during Putin’s first two terms but especially during 
his third term as section one illustrated that often the opposite is claimed by various media. It can 
therefore be argued that Putin’s consolidation of political power during his third term has not been 
supported by an increase of siloviki on key positions. Implications concerning this argument are 
further discussed in the third part of this section. 
Specific backgrounds of the siloviki  
From the 12 individuals that have been identified as confirmed siloviki, 7 have a background in the 
FSB/KGB, two in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), two in the Ministry for Emergency Situations 
(EMERCOM), and one in the Ministry of Defence (MO). This indicates that more than half (58.3%) of 
the identified siloviki has a FSB-background. In order to compare siloviki representation in Putin’s third 
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term to his earlier terms according to backgrounds, the annual representation is reflected in the 
following figure: 
 
Figure 2: Annual siloviki representation in key positions according to backgrounds during 2000-2016 
The figure clearly shows that individuals with a FSB-background have been the most dominant siloviki 
throughout the entire examined period. Since 2000, at least half of the positions occupied by 
confirmed siloviki have been filled by former FSB/KGB members. Putin’s third term shows no 
significant changes to this pattern of FSB/KGB domination in the siloviki clan, although it can be  
noticed that the number of siloviki with a FSB/KGB background has slightly declined during 
Medvedev’s term. Therefore the revisionist school is applicable as it argues that the siloviki clan is 
dominated by elites with a KGB or FSB background, although the part of this theory that follows the 
orthodox school (massive influx of siloviki) cannot be verified by the previous findings. Additionally, 
the term “FSB-ization”, often used by scholars to describe the same process as the revisionist school 
(Gomart 2008; Rivera & Rivera 2006; Van Bladel 2008), is therefore as well a suitable term to describe 
the proces of siloviki intrusion in the Russian political landscape according to the findings in this 
section. 
Dominance in specific bodies  
The positional identification clearly shows that certain bodies have been more dominantly occupied by 
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to duration of service are shown in table 6, which does not include the presidency. During each term, 
a full year of occupation is counted as 20% and an early resignation as 10%: 
Table 6: Positions and the percentages of time occupied by confirmed siloviki per term 
 2000-2004 2004-2008 2008-2012  2012-2016 Average 
1. Director of FSB 100 100 100 100 100 
2. Minister for 
Emergency Situations 
100 100 100 100 100 
3. Minister of Internal 
Affairs 
60 100 100 100 90 
4. Security Council 90 30 100 100 80 
5. Minister of Defence 100 70 0 90 65 
6. Director of SVR 100 70 0 0 43.5 
7. Chief of Staff 0 0 10 90 25 
 
What is most striking is that, overall, many of these positions (1, 2, 3 and 5) are part of the force 
structure bodies which have been identified in section two of this thesis. As these force structures are 
the source of the siloviki, and especially the first three have been almost constantly filled by confirmed 
siloviki, it appears that most of the siloviki return to where they came from (or stay). Also, not 
surprisingly, all the bodies presented in table 5 are part of the executive branch, which is considered 
the by far most powerful body in the Russian political system. Therefore it can be concluded that, 
within the hierarchy of positions that are selected for the positional identification, the confirmed 
siloviki are active in the strongest branch which includes many positions that are part of the force 
structures. 
Length of services 
As section two stated, a select group of siloviki are often labelled as the ‘core group’ who have been 
the closest to Putin for many years. In this final part of discussion on the positional identification 
results, a core group of siloviki according to length of services (excluding Putin) in key positions is 
composed in order to conclude similarities or differences, and possible changes during Putin’s third 
term. The top five of confirmed siloviki according to their length of services (same counts as previous 
examination) is shown in the following table: 
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Table 7: Siloviki and their length of services (percentages) in key positions per term 
 2000-2004 2004-2008 2008-2012  2012-2016 Average 
Nikolay Patrushev  100 100 100 100 100 
Sergey Ivanov  100 100 100 90 97.5 
Sergey Shoygu  100 100 100 90 97.5 
Alexander 
Bortkinov 
0 0 100 100 50 
Vladimir 
Kolokoltsev 
0 0 100 100 50 
 
According to length of services in top positions of power, Nikolay Patrushev, Sergey Ivanov and Sergey 
Shoygu stand out as they have all occupied key positions for a substantial amount of time. As section 
two mentioned, Patrushev and Ivanov are often labelled as core members of the siloviki team and this 
can indeed be confirmed by their length of services. The claim that Sergey Shoigu and Alexander 
Bortkinov can be considered as secondary members can also be derived from the table, although 
Bortkinov only ascended to a key position of power since Medvedev’s presidency. Two other 
frequently mentioned core members are not included in the top five: Igor Sechin and Viktor Ivanov. As 
the positional identification has labelled Sechin as an alleged silovik due to this mysterious biography 
and his relatively shorter period of service in one of the top-level positions (47.5%), he is not 
considered a member of the core group in this context. As for Viktor Ivanov, his occupational 
background lacks involvement in one of the key positions that have been selected for the positional 
identification, and consequently he is not considered a core member as well. It can therefore be 
argued that not all members who are generally considered to be part of the siloviki core group have   
served in the most significant positions of power. 
4.3 Indications and prospects  
The final part of this section elaborates on the previously discussed findings and outlines some 
indications and prospects concerning siloviki representation that might explain developments in the 
nearby future. As the previous part concluded, there is no direct link between the process of 
authoritarianism during Putin’s third presidential term and increased siloviki representation in the 
most essential positions of power. The main question that needs clarification in order to better 
understand Russia’s elites in the nearby future is therefore: what alternative sources of power have 
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assisted Putin in the process of increased authoritarianism? As extended research is required to 
answer this question, only the most likely developments are discussed next.   
According to the results of the positional identification, there is an assumed possibility that Putin is 
slowly moving away from his group of powerful loyalists in order to secure an unassailable position for 
the upcoming presidential elections in 2018. This possible trend can be supported by the unexpected 
dismissal of core silovik Sergey Ivanov in 2016, and other replacements of confirmed siloviki who have 
not been discussed in this thesis including Vladimir Yakunin in 2015 (former head of Russian Railways) 
and Andrei Belyaninov in 2016 (former head of the Federal Customs Service). As political analyst 
Stanislav Belkovsky stated, this is “a sign of Vladimir Putin’s focus on replacing his old friends at top 
posts in the executive branch with members of the servant staff, however high-ranking and polished 
they might be” (The New York Times 2016). This new ring of “servants” is useful as they do not 
constitute any threat to Putin’s position compared to the relatively more powerful siloviki. This 
replacement of siloviki by new loyalists could indicate that power is shifting towards another elite 
group, or even an additional consolidation of Putin’s personal power. But as these thoughts are merely 
based on speculation, extensive research should confirm these possible trends and ultimately identify 
these (new) elites.  
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Conclusion 
Putin’s first two terms in office marked the end of Russia’s democratic experiment of the 1990s during 
which post-communist power structures were dominated by Yeltsin and the oligarchs commonly 
referred to as the “seven bankers”. The consolidation and personalization of Putin’s power was 
accompanied by the elimination of the oligarchs and the influx of highly influential loyalists with 
backgrounds in one of the force structures. These siloviki elites soon received much attention from 
scholars and media, but research conducted during this period generally lacks clarification on a 
number of essential aspects. Additionally, as Putin’s third presidential term is rather underexposed 
under circumstances of increased authoritarian practices that are often linked to increased siloviki 
domination, extensive research is required in order to clarify past and present developments and 
better understand the role of the siloviki elites.  
This thesis has intended to fill some of these black gaps by focussing on siloviki representation during 
Putin’s third term compared to his earlier terms. Through a positional identification of the most 
influential positions of power throughout 2000-2016, siloviki representation has been measured and 
compared to earlier terms in order to conclude a number of distinctive trends. In contrast to earlier 
studies on siloviki representation, a relatively small number of individuals on key positions of power 
have been identified as results arguably provide more useful insides. The positions of power have 
been selected through a number of criteria and arguably represent the most influential posts in the 
Russian political system, although some may have been left out due to difficulties in actual power 
measurements. 
Results of the positional identification have demonstrated that mainly siloviki with FSB/KGB 
backgrounds have filled these key positions, of which many are derived from the force structures 
institutions. Secondly, the individuals that are often labelled as the core group have indeed served the 
longest on these posts of which almost all are part of the forceful executive branch. Finally and most 
importantly, siloviki representation in key positions of power has declined during Putin’s third term 
compared to his earlier terms, which is in line with the critical school theory. Therefore, against many 
expectations, increased authoritarianism since 2012 cannot be linked to increased siloviki domination 
on key positions of power. This might indicate that alternative sources of power have assisted Putin, 
although extensive research is required to identify these elites.   
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Appendix: Identification of key positions during 2000-2016 
 
Identification labels (siloviki) 
 
1. Federal Security Service (FSB) or Committee for State Security (KGB) 
2. The Ministry of Internal Affairs 
3. The Ministry of Defence (including the Armed Forces) 
4. The Ministry for Emergency Situations 
5. The Federal Protective Service                                     
?: Alleged involvement  
 
Positional labels 
 
A: Acting 
P: Position not occupied  
R: Resigned 
 
Abbreviations list for personal names: 
AB Alexander Bortkinov II Igor Ivanov SSH Sergey Shoygu 
ABE Andrey Belousov IK Ilya Klebanov VC Viktor Chernomyrdin 
AD Arkady Dvorkovich IS Igor Sergeyev VK Viktor Khristenko 
AG Alexey Gordeyev ISE Igor Sechin VKO Vladimir Kolokoltsev 
AGR Alexey Gromov ISH Igor Shuvalov VL Vyacheslav Lebedev 
AK Alexei Kudrin NP Nikolay Patrushev VM Valentina Matviyenko 
AKH Alexander Khloponin MB Marat Baglai VMU Vitaly Mutko 
AKO Alexander Konovalov MF Mikhail Fradkov VP Vladimir Putin  
AN Alexander Nekipelov MK Mikhail Kasyanov VPU Vladimir Puchkov 
AS Anatoly Serdyukov OG Olga Golodets VR Vladimir Rushailo 
AT Alexander Torshin RN Rashid Nurgaliyev VS Valentin Sobolev 
AV Alexander Voloshin SB Sergey 
Bogdanchikov 
VSU Vladislav Surkov 
AVA Anton Vaino SI Sergey Ivanov VU Vladimir Ustinov 
AZ Alexander Zhukov SK Sergey Kiriyenko VV Vyacheslav Volodin 
BA Boris Alyoshin SL Sergey Lavrov VY Vladimir Yakovlev 
BG Boris Gryzlov SLE Sergey Lebedev VZ Viktor Zubkov 
DK Dmitry Kozak SM Sergey Mironov VZO Valery Zorkin 
DM Dmitry Medvedev SN Sergey Naryshkin YC Yuri Chaika 
DR Dmitry Rogozin SP Sergey Prikhodko YS Yegor Stroyev 
GK Galina Karelova SS Sergey Sobyanin YT Yury Trutnev 
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                             1. Positional identification (2000-2008) 
 
Putin’s first presidential term 
(7 May 2000 – 7 May 2004) 
 
Putin’s second presidential term 
(7 May 2004- 7 May 2008) 
 
Positions 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
1. President VP 
(1) 
VP 
(1) 
VP  (1) VP 
(1) 
VP  
(1) 
 VP 
(1) 
VP 
(1) 
VP 
(1) 
VP 
(1) 
VP 
(1) 
2. Chief of Staff AV  
 
  
AV AV AV 
(R) 
DM  DM DM 
(R) 
SS SS SS 
DM SS 
3. First Deputy Chief 
of Staff 
DM DM DM DM 
(R) 
DK 
(R) 
 (P) (P) (P) (P) (P) 
DK 
4. Security Council 
Secretary 
SI (1) SI 
(1,R) 
VR  
(2) 
VR 
(2) 
VR 
(2,R) 
 II II II II  
(R) 
VS 
(1) 
VR 
(2) 
II VS 
(1)  
5. Prime Minister MK MK MK MK MK 
(R) 
 MF 
(?) 
MF 
(?) 
MF 
(?) 
MF 
(?,R) 
VZ 
VK 
(A) 
VZ 
MF 
(?) 
6. First Deputy Prime 
Minister 
(P) (P) (P) (P) (P)  (P) DM DM DM DM 
SI  
(1) 
SI 
(1) 
7. Deputy Prime 
Minister 
VM VM VM  VM 
(R) 
VK  AZ AZ AZ AZ AZ 
VK VK VK VK  AK SI  
(1) 
SI  
(1) 
SI 
(1,R) 
SN 
(?) 
SN 
(?) 
IK  
(?) 
IK 
(?) 
IK 
(?,R) 
AK AG AK AK 
AK AK AK AG GK 
AG AG AG GK BA 
BA VY 
VY AZ 
8. Minister for 
Emergency 
Situations 
SSH 
(4) 
SSH 
(4) 
SSH 
(4) 
SSH 
(4) 
SSH 
(4) 
 SSH 
(4) 
SSH 
(4) 
SSH 
(4) 
SSH 
(4) 
SSH 
(4) 
9. Minister of Justice YC YC YC YC YC  YC YC YC 
(R) 
VU 
(?) 
VU 
(?) 
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Note. The First Deputy Prime Minister post was not filled from May 2000 to November 2005, and the 
First Deputy Chief of Staff post was not filled during Putin’s entire second term. 
 
 
 
VU 
(?) 
10. Minister of 
Defence 
IS  
(3) 
IS  
(3,R) 
SI  
(1) 
SI  
(1) 
SI  
(1) 
 SI  
(1) 
SI  
(1) 
SI  
(1) 
SI  
(1,R) 
AS 
SI (1) AS 
11. Minister of 
Internal Affairs 
VR 
(2) 
VR 
(2,R) 
BG BG 
(R) 
RN  
(1,A) 
 RN 
(1) 
RN 
(1) 
RN 
(1) 
RN 
(1) 
RN 
(1) 
BG RN 
(1,A) 
RN 
(1) 
12. Minister of 
Foreign Affairs 
II II II II II (R)  SL SL SL SL SL 
SL 
13. Director of FSB NP 
(1) 
NP 
(1) 
NP 
(1) 
NP 
(1) 
NP 
(1) 
 NP 
(1) 
NP 
(1) 
NP 
(1) 
NP 
(1) 
NP 
(1) 
14. Director of SVR SLE 
(1) 
SLE 
(1) 
SLE 
(1) 
SLE 
(1) 
SLE 
(1) 
 SLE  
(1) 
SLE 
(1) 
SLE 
(1) 
SLE 
(1,R) 
MF 
(?) 
MF 
(?) 
15. State Duma 
Chairman 
GS GS GS GS 
(R) 
BG  BG BG BG BG BG 
BG 
16. Federation 
Council Chairman 
YS YS 
(R) 
SM SM SM  SM SM SM SM SM 
SM 
17. Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court 
VL VL VL VL VL  VL VL VL VL VL 
18. Chairman of the 
Constitutional Court 
MB MB MB MB 
(R) 
VZO  VZO VZO VZO VZO VZO 
VZO 
19. Prosecutor 
General 
VU 
(?) 
VU 
(?) 
VU 
(?) 
VU 
(?) 
VU 
(?) 
 VU 
(?) 
VU  
(?) 
VU 
(?,R) 
YC YC 
YC 
20. Gazprom 
Chairman 
VC 
(R) 
DM DM DM DM  DM DM DM DM DM 
DM 
21. Rosneft 
Chairman 
SB  SB SB SB SB  SB 
(R) 
ISE 
(?) 
ISE 
(?) 
ISE 
(?) 
ISE 
(?) 
ISE 
(?) 
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                             2. Positional identification (2008-2016)  
 
Medvedev’s presidential term 
(7 may 2008- 7 may 2012) 
 
 Putin’s third presidential term 
(7 May 2012- 31 November 2016) 
Positions 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
1. President DM DM DM DM DM  VP 
(1) 
VP 
(1) 
VP 
(1) 
VP 
(1) 
VP 
(1) 
2. Chief of Staff SN 
(?) 
  
SN 
(?) 
SN  
(?) 
SN 
(?) 
SN 
(?,R) 
 
 SI  
(1) 
SI  
(1) 
SI  
(1) 
SI  
(1) 
SI 
(1,R) 
VS 
(A) 
AVA  
SI (1) 
3. First Deputy Chief 
of Staff 
VSU VSU VSU VSU 
(R) 
VV  VV VV VV VV VV 
(R) 
VV AGR AGR AGR AGR AGR 
SK 
4. Security Council 
Secretary 
NP 
(1) 
NP 
(1) 
NP  
(1) 
NP 
(1) 
NP 
(1) 
 NP 
(1) 
NP 
(1) 
NP 
(1) 
NP 
(1) 
NP 
(1) 
5. Prime Minister VP 
(1) 
VP 
(1) 
VP  
(1) 
VP 
(1) 
VP 
(1) 
 DM DM DM DM DM 
6. First Deputy Prime 
Minister 
ISH 
 
ISH ISH ISH ISH  ISH ISH ISH ISH ISH 
VZ VZ VZ VZ VZ 
7. Deputy Prime 
Minister 
AZ 
 
AZ AZ AZ 
(R) 
ISE  
(?) 
 DK DK DK DK DK 
SI  
(1) 
SI  
(1) 
SI  
(1) 
SI  
(1,R) 
AKH AKH AKH AKH AKH 
AK AK AK AK 
(R) 
DR DR DR DR DR 
SS SS SS  
(R) 
ISE 
(?) 
DK VSU VSU 
(R) 
AD AD AD 
AD AD OG 
ISE  
(?) 
ISE 
(?) 
ISE  
(?) 
DK AKH OG OG OG OG SP 
DK DK DK AKH DR SP SP SP YT 
AKH VV 
(R) 
VSU 
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VV DR YT YT YT VMU 
VSU 
8. Minister for 
Emergency 
Situations 
SSH 
(4) 
SSH 
(4) 
SSH 
(4) 
SSH 
(4) 
SSH 
(4) 
 VPU 
(4) 
VPU 
(4) 
VPU 
(4) 
VPU 
(4) 
VPU 
(4) 
9. Minister of Justice AKO AKO AKO AKO AKO  AKO AKO AKO AKO AKO 
10. Minister of 
Defence 
AS AS AS AS AS  AS 
(R) 
SSH 
(4) 
SSH 
(4) 
SSH 
(4) 
SSH 
(4) 
SSH 
(4) 
11. Minister of 
Internal Affairs 
VKO 
(2) 
VKO 
(2) 
VKO 
(2) 
VKO 
(2) 
VKO 
(2) 
 VKO 
(2) 
VKO 
(2) 
VKO 
(2) 
VKO 
(2) 
VKO 
(2) 
12. Minister of 
Foreign Affairs 
SL SL SL SL SL  SL SL SL SL SL 
13. Director of FSB AB 
(1) 
AB 
(1) 
AB 
(1) 
AB 
(1) 
AB 
(1) 
 AB 
(1) 
AB 
(1) 
AB 
(1) 
AB 
(1) 
AB 
(1) 
14. Director of SVR MF 
(?) 
MF 
(?) 
MF 
(?) 
MF 
(?) 
MF 
(?) 
 MF 
(?) 
MF 
(?) 
MF 
(?) 
MF 
(?) 
MF 
(?,R) 
SN 
(?) 
15. State Duma 
Chairman 
BG BG BG BG 
(R) 
SN 
(?) 
 SN 
(?) 
SN 
(?) 
SN 
(?) 
SN 
(?) 
SN 
(?,R) 
SN 
(?) 
VV 
16. Federation 
Council Chairman 
SM SM SM SM 
(R) 
VM  VM VM VM VM VM 
AT 
(A) 
VM 
17. Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court 
VL VL VL VL VL  VL VL VL VL VL 
18. Chairman of the 
Constitutional Court 
VZO VZO VZO VZO VZO  VZO VZO VZO VZO VZO 
19. Prosecutor 
General 
YC YC YC YC YC  YC YC YC YC YC 
20. Gazprom 
Chairman 
VZ VZ VZ VZ VZ  VZ VZ VZ VZ VZ 
21. Rosneft 
Chairman 
ISE 
(?) 
ISE 
(?) 
ISE 
(?) 
ISE 
(?,R) 
AN  AN AN AN AN 
(R) 
AB 
AN AB 
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Positional identification sources 
 
Governmental websites 
President of Russia: Structure. (2016). Retrieved from President of Russia: http://en.kremlin.ru/ 
The Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation: Administration. (2016). Retrieved from The 
Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation: http://eng.genproc.gov.ru/ 
The Russian Government. (2016). Retrieved from The Russian Government: http://government.ru/en/ 
RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL: Council Members. (2016). Retrieved from RUSSIAN INTERNATIONAL: 
http://russiancouncil.ru/en/about-us/members_RSMD/ 
Articles from websites 
Business Pundit. (2011, October 6). 10 Former KGB Officers Who Are Now Filthy Rich. Business Pundit. 
Retrieved from http://www.businesspundit.com/10-former-kgb-officers-who-are-now-filthy-
rich/ 
Croucher, S. (2015). Nikolai Patrushev: The Siloviki spook rumoured to have ousted Vladimir Putin in 
Kremlin coup. Retrieved from International Business Times: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/nikolai-
patrushev-siloviki-spook-rumoured-have-ousted-vladimir-putin-kremlin-coup-1492134 
Economist, T. (2015). Russia's Sergei Shoigu: Master of emergencies. Retrieved from The Economist : 
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21677992-trusty-defence-minister-only-person-
serve-every-government-fall 
Elder, M. (2007, October 8). Fradkov Named Foreign Spymaster. The Moscow Times. Retrieved from 
http://old.themoscowtimes.com/sitemap/free/2007/10/article/fradkov-named-foreign-
spymaster/193812.html/ 
Grobman, E. (2016). Inside the power struggle within the Russian elite. Retrieved from Russia Direct: 
http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/inside-power-struggle-within-russian-elite 
Officials and politicians. (2016). Retrieved from Russian Maffia: http://rumafia.com/en/dosje/474-
sergey-lavrov.html 
REUTERS. (2010). Factbox: Russia's energy tsar: who is Igor Sechin? REUTERS. Retrieved from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-sechin-facts-idUSTRE65J0GB20100620 
Sinelschikova, Y. (2016). Sergei Ivanov: Who is the official Putin has just fired? Retrieved from Russia 
Beyond The Headlines: http://rbth.com/politics_and_society/2016/08/15/sergei-ivanov-who-
is-the-official-putin-has-just-fired_621223 
Solovyov, D. (2007, July 18). KGB veteran becomes Russian security council head. REUTERS. Retrieved 
from http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-security-idUKL1891146520070718 
Academic articles and books 
Bacon, E., Renz, B., & Cooper, J. (2006). Securitising Russia: The Domestic Politics of Vladimir Putin. 
Manchester University Press. 
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Krickus, R. J. (2006). IRON TROIKAS: THE NEW THREAT FROM THE EAST. Strategic Studies Institute. 
Retrieved from http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub643.pdf 
Sergi, B. S. (2009). Misinterpreting Modern Russia: Western Views of Putin and His Presidency. 
Continuum International Publishing Group. 
Shlapentokh, V., & Arutunyan, A. (2013). Freedom, Repression, and Private Property in Russia. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Szászdi, L. F. (2008). Russian civil-military relations and the origins of the second Chechen war. 
University Press of America. 
Taylor, B. D. (2011). State Building in Putin's Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Turner, B. (2014). The Statesman's Yearbook 2015: The Politics, Cultures and Economies of the World. 
Palgrave Macmillan UK. 
Other 
Bio: People. (2016). Retrieved from Biography.com: http://www.biography.com/people 
Bloomberg: People. (2016). Retrieved from Bloomberg: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/people.asp?privcapId=24469734 
Desperado Philisophy. (2012). Tag Archives: alexander bortnikov. Philisophy, Desperado. Retrieved 
from https://desperadophilosophy.net/tag/alexander-bortnikov/ 
Gazprom: Governing bodies. (2016). Retrieved from Gazprom: 
http://www.gazprom.com/about/management/ 
LinkedIn. (2016). LinkedIn. Retrieved from LinkedIn: https://nl.linkedin.com/ 
Rosneft: Corporate Governance. (2016). Retrieved from Rosneft: 
https://www.rosneft.com/governance/board/ 
Russiapedia. (2016). Prominent Russians: faces of Russia. Retrieved from Russiapedia: 
http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/ 
Schemmel, B. (2016). Rulers: Russia. Retrieved from Rulers: http://www.rulers.org/russgov.html 
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